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Recognizing similarity between one’s own and others’ actions is important for identifying
others with whom to aﬃliate and from whom to learn. In this study, 40 19-month-old tod-
dlers recognized when a puppet chose the same toys as them. Toddlers preferred to aﬃli-
ate with a puppet who chose the same toys as themselves relative to a puppet who chose
other toys and they modiﬁed their subsequent behavior by choosing the same toys as that
puppet when presented with novel toys. Toddlers’ actions were not based on perceivable
features of the puppet (e.g., similar accent or language as oneself) or an association
between the puppet and the preferred toys (as assessed in a control condition). Results
indicate that toddlers identiﬁed and recognized the similarity in action choices between
themselves and the puppet via comparison between their own and the puppets’ actions.
Identifying this similarity is critical for children’s developing understanding of and engage-
ment in interactions with others.
The ability to distinguish one’s preferences from others’ is a critical step to under-
standing others’ actions and mental states. In the second year of life, young toddlers
recognize when others’ preferences diﬀer from their own and can use this information
to guide their behavior accordingly. In a classic study by Repacholi and Gopnik
(1997), toddlers used information they received about another person’s food prefer-
ence to inform their actions on that speciﬁc food item (i.e., give her the food she pre-
ferred instead of the food the toddler preferred). In our everyday interactions, we
need to recognize others’ preferences and patterns of behavior in a broader sense. It
is important to learn peoples’ preferences for particular items (e.g., that your class-
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mate hates puzzles), but further recognizing patterns of behavior is important for
choosing with whom to interact and for making predictions about another person’s
actions in a new context and how those actions might relate to oneself (e.g., that
your neighbor tends to like the same games you do and, so, you can probably trust
that you will like the games she chooses in the future). As we learn about more gen-
eral tendencies concerning others’ preferences, we come to realize that, at least within
domains (e.g., foods, hobbies), our own preferences align with some individuals and
deviate from others.
Here, we argue that monitoring behavioral patterns and comparing them to our
own is an important basis for identifying similar others with whom we prefer to inter-
act and whose action choices might inﬂuence our own behavior in the future. This
notion is consistent with theoretical perspectives emphasizing the importance of
comparisons between self and other for social cognitive development (Barresi &
Moore, 1996; Meltzoﬀ, 2007; Gerson, 2014). According to Meltzoﬀ’s “like me” frame-
work, “the bedrock on which commonsense psychology is constructed is the apprehen-
sion that others are similar to the self” (Meltzoﬀ, 2007, p. 27). Meltzoﬀ suggests that
the recognition of others as similar to the self is a starting point for social cognition.
Whereas this theory broadly deﬁnes those that the child identiﬁes as “like me” as
agents or social beings (relative to inanimate objects), the current research more closely
examines the intricacies of similarly behaving others.
In this study, we examine whether 19-month-old toddlers recognize similar behav-
ioral patterns (i.e., action choices for toys) between self and other and base future
actions on these similarities. More speciﬁcally, we investigate whether young toddlers
identiﬁed puppets who had chosen the same or diﬀerent toys from them, preferred to
interact with the similar puppet, and made future (novel) toy choices based on the
similar puppet’s actions. This research addresses how young toddlers begin to recog-
nize similar others based on behavioral, rather than featural, information and investi-
gates whether one’s own action choices are, in part, determined by the actions of
similar, relative to dissimilar, acting others.
PREFERENCE FOR SIMILAR OTHERS
As humans, we like those who are similar to us. We prefer others who speak our lan-
guage (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007), have our accent (Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus,
& Spelke, 2009), and are the same gender as us (Wolﬀ, Kemter, Schweinberger, &
Wiese, 2014). Recent research suggests that children both aﬃliate with and prefer to
learn from those similar to them in perceptual features. For example, 3-year-old chil-
dren tend to imitate the activity or object choice of an individual who is similar to
them in age, gender, or native language (Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, & Woodward,
2014; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010). At 18 months, toddlers selectively imitated the
actions of a native, relative to a foreign, speaker when actions were presented via video
(Howard et al., 2014). At 12 months, infants chose the same food as others who spoke
their native language (relative to foreign speakers; Shutts, Kinzler, McKee, & Spelke,
2009; see also Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). Overall, infants and
young children seem to imitate the actions and action choices of others who share
objective, external features with them (similar language, race, or gender) in a variety of
contexts.
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CONTRASTING PERCEPTUAL SIMILARITY WITH ACTION CHOICE SIMILARITY
Whether infants and children can use information about the action choices, in addition
to perceptual features, of another individual to detect when others are similar to them
(e.g., act on, or prefer, the same toys) is important for understanding how infants and
children recognize similar others within or across larger groups. Identifying similar
others based on perceptual features is likely important for a variety of reasons. For
example, those who have similar accents and speak the same language as us are useful
resources for learning new words. Outside the domain of language learning, however,
recognizing that someone acts in similar ways to oneself is potentially more useful for
informing future action choices than recognizing similarities based on accent or gender,
for example, given that action choices, but not external features, reﬂect internal states
such as preferences. For example, if someone likes the same food I do (as seen in their
choice of one food over another), I should trust his or her opinion about a novel food
more so than someone who is merely similarly female.
COPYING CHOICES OF SIMILARLY ACTING OTHERS
Research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Kauﬀman, Kneedler, Gamache, Hal-
lahan, & Ball, 1977; Thelen, Dollinger, & Roberts, 1975; Thelen, Frautschi, Roberts,
Kirkland, & Dollinger, 1981) suggests that kindergarten and ﬁrst-grade children
showed increased attraction toward and imitation of an individual who conveyed simi-
lar preferences via actions (i.e., chose the same color crayon), relative to an individual
who did not demonstrate similar preferences (Thelen et al., 1975).
Surprisingly, little research has gone beyond that conducted by Thelen et al. (1975)
to explore whether, earlier than kindergarten, children base their future behaviors on
the observed behavior of those who shared preferences (via similar action tendencies).
An experiment by Fawcett and Markson (2010), however, is indicative that 2-year-olds
base their action choices on those of a similarly acting other when the preferences they
share are relatively universal. In this study, 2-year-old children viewed an actor play
with either exciting objects (similarly preferred by the child) or boring objects (not pre-
ferred by the child). When given the chance to choose between hidden objects based
on the actor’s choice, children chose the same object as the actor who had previously
chosen the exciting objects rather than the boring objects.
INFANTS PREFER SIMILARLY ACTING OTHERS
More recent work has found evidence that younger children prefer to interact with an
individual who previously acted on the same object as oneself. In this work (Mahajan
& Wynn, 2012), 11-month-old infants chose between two foods and viewed puppets
who acted on the same or diﬀerent foods as themselves. The infants were then asked
with whom they would prefer to play. Infants tended to choose the puppet with the
matching food preference as themselves. This ﬁnding is important in establishing that
infants recognize and prefer individuals who share similar preferences with themselves.
It is limited, however, in that food preferences were matched on only one trial (i.e., for
one item), thus indicating a simple tracking of one preference and not across actions.
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LIMITATIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH
Prior research has not suﬃciently ruled out the possibility that lower-level explanations
could have driven young children’s behavior. In particular, whether a preference for
similarly acting others is a function of attention to the similarly acting individual or
preferred object (i.e., orientation or looking toward the individual), based on an associ-
ation between the positively valenced object and that particular individual, or based
on a more intricate understanding of the other’s actions (i.e., recognition that this per-
son shares action goals with oneself) in these developmentally early cases is relatively
unexplored but important for identifying the development of this preference. The pos-
sible confound of attention is pertinent because previous research has found that
infants tend to look more toward an individual who imitates their actions than to an
individual who acts in an inconsistent manner with their own actions (Meltzoﬀ, 2007).
Of the above-discussed research, only Thelen et al. (1975) found that imitation of
action choices and preference for the similar other was not a function of diﬀerential
looking (i.e., attention) to either individual. In the research by Fawcett and Markson
(2010) and Mahajan and Wynn (2012), no coding of children’s gaze was reported.
Therefore, object or puppet choices due to diﬀerences in attention cannot be ruled out.
Discovering whether attention toward similar and dissimilar others diﬀers is important
for uncovering the mechanism via which children begin to recognize and act on
similarities between self and other. This is one of our aims in the current study.
CURRENT STUDY
In the current study, we assessed whether 19-month-old toddlers recognized similar
action choices (i.e., choices for toys without an objective valence) between self and
other, preferred interacting with similar others, and used this information to guide
future behavior (i.e., generalized shared toy choices to novel toys). Nineteen-month-old
infants were tested based on previous research indicating that young toddlers can rec-
ognize when an individual’s preference diﬀers from their own (Repacholi & Gopnik,
1997). This age range also falls between that of Mahajan and Wynn (2012) and Faw-
cett and Markson (2010). That is, we investigated how young toddlers determine who
is “like me” on an individual action choice level. Speciﬁcally, in the key choice condi-
tion, toddlers were introduced to two puppets, one of whom always chose the same
toy as the child during familiarization trials and one who always chose the opposite
toy. In this way, toddlers could recognize the matched or mismatched action choice
based on the matched structural goal relation between self and the puppet (see Wood-
ward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson, & Buresh, 2009 for a discussion of goal rela-
tions). When the puppet chose the same toy as the child, the relation between the child
and the desired object (e.g., child [agent]: turtle toy) was identical to that of the puppet
and the desired object (e.g., puppet [agent]: turtle toy). When, however, the puppet
chose the opposite object, the goal relations were mismatched. During test trials, the
child chose to interact with one of the two puppets and had the chance to copy the
toy choice (i.e., copy toy picked by individual when presented with new toys) of one of
the two puppets. If toddlers recognized that the matched action choices between self
and other were indicative of similarity between goals (or shared preferences), they
should prefer to play with the similar puppet. Further, if toddlers generalized matched
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action tendencies (i.e., choosing the same toys) between self and other (puppet) across
individual trials to novel toys, they should choose the same toy as the puppet who
shared their preferences during familiarization when introduced to new toys in toy
choice test trials. The use of puppets as social partners and mentalistic agents is well
established (e.g., Bartsch, Wade, & Estes, 2011; Hamlin & Wynn, 2012; Mahajan &
Wynn, 2012; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) and allowed us to control and
match actions with fewer experimenters.
In a second condition, we controlled for the possibility of a mere perceptual associa-
tion between one of the puppets and the toys preferred by the child. In the Assign con-
dition, one puppet was consistently assigned the same toy the child chose during each
familiarization trial and the other puppet was consistently assigned the opposite toy.
In this way, the physical relation between the puppets and the toys was identical to
that in the Choose condition, but the goal relation diﬀered in that the puppet did not
retrieve his preferred toy, but instead received the toy indicated by a second experi-
menter. If toddlers’ behavior in the choice condition was based on an association
between the toy they preferred and the puppet who received it, then they should simi-
larly choose to play with and choose the same toy as the puppet that received the same
toys in the Assign condition. If, however, toddlers recognized the matched action
choices (i.e., goal relations) between themselves and the puppet, they should not prefer
to interact with or choose the same toy as the puppet who received the similar toys in
this condition because the puppet’s receiving of the toys during familiarization did not
imply that the puppet had the same preference for or intention toward acting on that
toy as that of the child (and, thus, his or her future preferences as expressed via action
choices are not alignable with the child’s).
Importantly, we also measured toddlers’ gaze to the diﬀerent toys and puppets in
both of these conditions to assess whether any diﬀerences between conditions were due
to attentional diﬀerences in the familiarization or test trials. If toddlers attend more to
the similar puppet than the dissimilar puppet during either familiarization or toy
choice test trials in the choice, but not the Assign condition, this would leave open the
possibility that orientation toward a particular puppet due to low-level factors drives
toddlers’ subsequent behavior in test trials. If, however, toddlers spend an equivalent
amount of time attending to both puppets in both conditions, this would suggest that
any diﬀerences in toy choice or interaction preference are based on toddlers’ interpre-
tation of the actions on a goal level.
METHODS
Participants
Forty 18- to 20-month-old toddlers (18 males) were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions, Choose (n = 20; M age = 19 months, 10 days) or Assign (n = 20; M
age = 19, 13 days). An additional four toddlers were not included in the ﬁnal sample
due to failure to complete the study. All toddlers were recruited via a database of fam-
ilies who volunteered to participate in infant and child studies, were born full term,
and had no reported developmental delays. The sample was largely Caucasian and
middle class and from a mid-sized European metropolitan region.
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Stimuli
Two hand puppets were used in this study: a fox and a raccoon. Piloting was
conducted with a set of eighteen small toys (approximately 5 cm) to create pairs of
toys that were chosen approximately equally across children. The same eight toys were
always presented in pseudorandomized order during familiarization trials, and the
other ten were pseudorandomly presented in pairs in the test trials.
Procedure
Following written informed consent, toddlers were seated on a parent’s lap at a table
across from an experimenter during the entirety of the session. Parents were asked not
to interfere but to encourage the toddler to play if they were reticent. A camera facing
the toddler recorded the full session for oﬄine coding. In both conditions, toddlers
participated in four familiarization trials, ﬁve toy choice test trials, and a ﬁnal interac-
tion preference trial. The familiarization trials diﬀered between conditions; toy choice
test trials and the interaction preference trial were identical across conditions.
Familiarization
Familiarization diﬀered as a function of condition, which was varied between subjects.
Below, we describe the familiarization trials for both the Choose and the Assign
conditions.
Choose condition
In each familiarization trial, toddlers in the Choose condition received a pair of
toys contained within green, translucent buckets. The toys were passed across the
table by the experimenter such that each toy was equidistant from the child and
within the child’s reach. The order of pairs presented and which toy within a pair
was presented on which side was counterbalanced across participants. The toddler
was encouraged to choose one of the two toys (see Figure 1). If the toddler did not
respond within approximately 30-s, the experimenter took both toys out of the buck-
ets and placed them in front of the child, being careful to place both toys at the
same time. If the toddler clearly chose one toy, the other toy was removed. If chil-
dren chose both toys, they were allowed to hold on to both toys. The experimenter
then asked the toddler which toy he or she wanted (original language: “Welke wil je?
Wil je er een?”). The toddler was given approximately 15–30 s to play with the toy
before the experimenter retrieved the toy(s). The experimenter then placed the toys
back in the buckets (out of sight of the child) and returned them to the tabletop, in
front of the experimenter and out of the child’s reach. The experimenter told the
child that someone else wanted to play with the toys and introduced one of the two
puppets. The order in which puppets were presented in familiarization trials was
counterbalanced across toddlers. The two puppets alternated appearances across
familiarization trials, each appearing twice across the four trials (see Figure 2). One
of the two puppets chose the same toy the child had chosen both times, whereas the
other puppet chose the opposite toy (see Coding section below for details). The
choices made by the puppets were identiﬁed on a trial-by-trial, child-by-child, basis
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(i.e., puppet choices were individualized to match the speciﬁc choices of the infant on
each trial). Whether the fox or raccoon puppet chose the same or diﬀerent toy was
counterbalanced across toddlers. In similar puppet trials, the puppet looked at both
toys and at the child, noting how nice both toys looked and saying he wanted to
play. He then chose the same toy the child had previously chosen, saying he found
that toy better (see Figure 1b). The experimenter then told the child, “See that? Mis-
ter Fox [or Raccoon] chose the same toy you did!” (original language: “Zie je dat?
Meneer Vos [or Wasbeer] heeft hetzelfde speeltje als jij gekozen!”). In the dissimilar
puppet trials, the puppet carried out the same actions as in the same puppet trials,
except that he always chose the opposite toy. After he made his choice, the experi-
menter said, “See that? Mister Raccoon [or Fox] chose the other toy!” (original lan-
guage: “Zie je dat? Meneer Wasbeer [or Vos] heeft het andere speeltje dan jij
gekozen!”). The toys were then removed from the table to begin the next familiariza-
tion trial, in which the child chose between two new toys. Note that both the similar
and dissimilar puppets chose the toy by stating their choice and holding the bucket
that contained the toy of choice. The puppet never touched the toy itself so that
both toys were always equally visible. In this way, the goal relation between the child
and his or her toy choice was matched to that of the similar puppet (and mis-
matched with the dissimilar puppet), but the physical instantiation of the toy choice
varied between puppet and child.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1 In familiarization trials, infants in both conditions ﬁrst chose between two toys (a). In the
Choose condition, infants then saw a puppet choose the same (b) or diﬀerent toy than the one they
had chosen. In the Assign condition, a second experimenter told the puppet he could play with one of
the two toys (c).
Figure 2 Across four familiarization trials, each puppet appeared twice and consistently chose the
same or a diﬀerent toy relative to the child’s choice.
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Assign condition
During familiarization trials in the Assign condition, a second experimenter sat to
the right of the original experimenter and was silent throughout the session except
when asked a question by the puppet, as described below. As in the Choose condition,
at the beginning of the familiarization trials, the child always had the chance to choose
between two toys. The toys were then replaced in front of the experimenter, and the
puppets each appeared in alternating trials. In the Assigned Same Toy trials, the pup-
pet looked at each of the toys and at the child and exclaimed how nice the toys were.
He then looked at the second experimenter and asked whether he could play with one
of the two toys (See Figure 1c). The second experimenter enthusiastically answered,
“Yes! You can play with the []!” (original language: “Ja! Jij mag met [toy the child
chose] spelen!”). The puppet responded, “Ooh! Look! I get this toy!” The experimenter
said, “See that? Mister Fox [or Raccoon] got the same toy as you!” (original language:
“Ooh! Kijk! Ik kan met dit speeltje spelen!”. . . “Zie je dat? Meneer Vos [or Wasbeer]
kan met hetzelfde speeltje als jij spelen!”). In the Assigned Diﬀerent Toy trials, the
same exact actions were carried out except that experimenter two told the puppet he
could play with the opposite toy and the experimenter exclaimed, “See that? Mister
Raccoon [or Fox] got the other toy!” (original language: “Zie je dat? Meneer Wasbeer
[or Vos] kan met het andere speeltje dan jij spelen!”). Thus, the only diﬀerence between
the two conditions was whether the puppet chose a toy himself or was assigned a toy
by the second experimenter. As in the Choose condition, the puppet held the bucket
containing the toy of choice rather than touching the toy itself. In this way, the physi-
cal relation between the puppet and the toy was identical in both conditions. In the
Assign condition, however, the goal relation was not matched between puppet and
child because the puppet did not choose a toy to act on himself (i.e., the goal relation
in the Assign condition incorporated the direction given by the second experimenter).
Test trials
Test trials were carried out identically across conditions. In the Assign condition, the
second experimenter remained seated so as not to disrupt the session but was silent
and gazed downward. Test trials always consisted of ﬁve toy choice test trials and one
interaction preference trial.
Toy choice test trials
In each toy choice test trial, a pair of toys was placed in front of the experimenter.
Both puppets were then introduced. The puppets each looked at both toys and chose
one of the two toys. The toy chosen within each pair, the side on which the puppet
and toy were presented, and which puppet chosen ﬁrst were each counterbalanced
across subjects. After each puppet chose a toy, the experimenter reminded the child of
the choices and drew the toddler’s attention to each of the choices, saying “See that?
Mister Fox chose the [name of toy] and Mister Raccoon chose the [name of other
toy]!” (original language: “Zie je dat? Meneer Vos heeft [name of toy] gekozen en
Meneer Wasbeer heeft [name of toy] gekozen!”). The experimenter ensured that the
toddler looked to both puppets and their choices before the puppets disappeared. The
experimenter then drew the child’s attention back to the center and asked with which
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toy the child would like to play. The toddler was encouraged to point to one of the
two toys while the toys were still out of reach. If the child did not respond within
approximately 30-s, the experimenter placed the toys (an equal distance apart) in front
of the child and encouraged the toddler to choose without drawing attention to either
toy in particular. After the toddler chose a toy, the child had approximately 30-s to
play before all toys were removed and the next trial began.
Interaction preference test trial
After the ﬁve toy choice test trials, the experimenter presented the toddler with
both puppets and asked with which puppet the child would like to play. The puppets
were held out within reach of the toddler, and the toddler was encouraged to choose
a puppet. If the child did not choose right away, the experimenter asked further
probing questions (e.g., Do you want to hug one of the puppets?; original language:
“Wil je een van deze knuﬀelen of een kusje geven?”). If the toddler did not choose
within approximately 30-s, the session was ended. Because this individual test trial
diﬀered from prior trials and always occurred at the end of the session, nine children
(n = 6 in Choose) did not make a choice during the interaction preference test trial.
This dropout rate is likely due to a combination of exhaustion, shyness, and
disinterest.
Coding
Three types of coding were completed: an online measure of choice during familiariza-
tion trials, an oﬄine assessment of choice during toy choice and interaction preference
test trials, and an oﬄine ﬁne-grained analysis of toddlers’ attention across familiariza-
tion and toy choice test trials.
Online familiarization trial coding
During familiarization trials, the experimenter noted the toy the toddler chose on
each trial (in the assigned condition, the ﬁrst experimenter did so within view of the
second experimenter but out of view of the infant). For cases in which the child did
not clearly choose one toy, the experimenter asked the child which toy was preferred.
If the toddler still did not choose one, the experimenter made a judgment based on the
child’s amount of engagement with and attention to each toy. A reliability coder, blind
to the experimenter’s online coding, assessed the child’s preference oﬄine and agreed
with the original experimenter in 90% of the cases across conditions (Cohen’s
kappa = 0.81). Only the original coder’s scores were used in analyses.
Offline toy choice test trial coding
Digitized videos of the session were coded oﬄine for the toddler’s choice during toy
choice test trials. The ﬁrst toy the child touched during or after looking at the toy was
coded as the toddler’s preference. This coding was consistent with other research cod-
ing toy preference in a toy choice paradigm (e.g., Gerson & Woodward, 2012; Hamlin,
Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). The coder also coded infants’ interaction preference by
noting the ﬁrst puppet touched by the infant during the interaction preference test
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trial. A second coder, blind to condition and hypotheses, double-coded all videos,1 and
the coders agreed in 97% of trials across toddlers (j = 0.93).2
Attention coding
Toddlers’ attention to the toys, puppets, and experimenter was coded throughout
the portion of the familiarization and toy choice test trials that the puppet(s) were act-
ing (i.e., not while the child was acting) using ELAN software (http://tla.mpi.nl/tools/
tla-tools/elan/; Wittenburg, Brugman, Russel, Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006). During
familiarization trials, the coder assessed the duration and number of gazes toward the
puppet, the experimenter(s), and the left and right toys. In toy choice test trials, the
coder assessed toddlers’ looking to the experimenter(s) and left or right side of the
experimenter, combining looks to the left puppet and left toy, for example, into one
code. Because the puppet was always presented on the same side as the toy he chose,
this created a measure of attention toward each puppet and his toy choice, deﬁned by
spatial side. Four toddlers’ data were not included in attentional analyses due to
equipment error (i.e., unable to code at a more ﬁne-grained level). Twenty-ﬁve percent
of videos were double-coded, and the two coders had high intraclass correlations for
coding of attention during both the familiarization and test phases (ICCs > 0.82,
ps < 0.001).
Bias coding
Given that the same experimenter conducted the familiarization and test trials, addi-
tional coding was conducted to ensure that the experimenter did not subconsciously
bias the infants’ behavior in accord with hypotheses. A newly trained coder, blind to
the hypotheses of the study, the condition of each participant, or the puppet who was
similar or dissimilar coded the videos of the majority of participants (N = 35) for pos-
sible bias. The coder watched the toy choice test trials and noted his best guess as to
any bias by predicting which puppet the child might copy based on the following crite-
ria in hierarchical order of priorities: (1) whether one toy was physically closer to the
child than another (he noted, however, that this occurred extremely rarely), (2) how
long and how engaging the puppet’s speech was, and (3) the experimenter’s focus of
attention to one side or another. If he could not choose based on these criteria, he
guessed based on his intuition. This coding revealed that his guesses as to the preferred
puppet across trials for each participant were no diﬀerent from chance (p = .27) and
were unrelated to infants’ proportion of similar toy choice across conditions (r = .06)
or within either condition (Choose: r = .22; Assign: r = .002). The rate at which
the bias coder guessed the puppet who acted similarly to the child was marginally dif-
ferent between conditions (t(33) = 1.86, p = .07) such that it was slightly higher in the
Choose condition (M = 0.57, SEM = 0.04) than in the Assign condition (M = 0.48,
SEM = 0.02). The fact that this was not signiﬁcant and that the coder’s guesses were
1Three infants could not be coded due to loss of video data following initial coding.
2The reason we veered from this coding scheme for the familiarization trials was because some infants
chose one toy and then clearly became more interested in the other toy and we wanted to assure that the
puppets’ toy assignments were based on the infant’s preference for a particular toy and not their ﬁrst
impulse. We coded ﬁrst touch as well, and this was consistent in 77% of the trials across conditions.
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unrelated to the children’s actions, however, suggests that any possible bias did not
drive the eﬀects seen.
RESULTS
Toy choice test trials
In each condition, we conducted one-sample t-tests for with the proportion of toy
choice test trials for which the child chose the same toy as the similar puppet as the
dependent variable against chance rate (50%). Proportion scores were used, in accor-
dance with the previous literature (e.g., Gerson & Woodward, 2012; Hamlin et al.,
2008; Thoermer, Woodward, Sodian, Perst, & Kristen, 2013), account for the fact that
some toddlers only had usable data on 4 of ﬁve test trials (due to not choosing or
choosing both toys simultaneously on some trials, n = 3) and assess infants’ behaviors
relative to chance levels. In the Choose condition, toddlers chose the same toy as the
similar puppet signiﬁcantly more often than would be expected by chance, t(19)
= 2.60, p = .017, Cohen’s d = 1.19, M = 0.61 [SEM = 0.04]. In the Assign condition,
toddlers’ toy choice did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from chance level, t(19) = 0.67, p = .51,
Cohen’s d = 0.31, M = 0.53 (SEM = 0.04) (see Figure 3). Nonparametric analyses con-
ﬁrmed these patterns. One-sample Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test indicated that toddlers’
behavior diﬀered from chance in the Choose condition (p = .022) but not in the Assign
condition (p = .52). In contrast to our prediction, however, children in the two condi-
tions did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from one another in their rates of toy choice with
regard to the similar puppet, t(38) = 1.43, p = .16, Cohen’s d = 0.46 (nonparametric
Mann–Whitney test: Z = 1.36, p = .17).
Interaction preference test trial
We conducted binomial tests for each condition to assess whether the number of tod-
dlers who preferred to aﬃliate with the similar or dissimilar puppet diﬀered signiﬁ-
cantly. In the Choose condition, of the 14 children who acted on one of the two
puppets, 12 preferred to aﬃliate with the similar puppet, whereas only two preferred
Figure 3 Infants in the Choose condition chose the same toy signiﬁcantly more often than would be
expected by chance (*p < .05). Infants in the Assign condition did not. Means are plotted with
standard errors represented in the error bars.
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to aﬃliate with the dissimilar puppet, p = .035. In the Assign condition, the 17
children who chose a puppet did not signiﬁcantly prefer either puppet, p = .14 (similar:
n = 5, dissimilar: n = 12). A chi-square test indicated that toddlers in the two condi-
tions diﬀered from one another in their aﬃliative choices, v2(1) = 8.19, p = .004.
Attention
During each familiarization trial, we measured whether toddlers attended (as deﬁned
by gaze toward an object or event) similarly to the chosen toy vs. the toy not chosen
in the two conditions to ensure that children were similarly attentive to the preferred
toy when it was chosen by or given to a puppet (regardless of whether the puppet
made the same or diﬀerent toy choices as the child). A repeated-measures ANOVA
with attention to each toy (chosen or nonchosen) as a within-subjects factor and
condition (choose or assign) as a between-subjects factor revealed a main eﬀect of
toys, F(1,33) = 143.19, p < .001, gp
2 = 0.81, no eﬀect of condition, F(1,33) = 0.034,
p = .86, gp
2 = 0.001, and a marginal interaction between condition and toys, F(1,33)
= 3.94, p = .055, gp
2 = 0.11. The marginal interaction hinted that toddlers in the
Assign condition showed a larger diﬀerence between the chosen and other toy than
toddlers in the Choose condition, but this interaction did not reach signiﬁcance and,
across both conditions, children attended more to the toy the puppet chose than to
the toy the puppet did not choose (mean diﬀerence = 4.74 and 3.39, respectively,
ps < 0.001).
We then compared the amount of time toddlers attended to the chosen toy of the
similar puppet (i.e., the toy the child had previously chosen) vs. the dissimilar puppet
(i.e., the toy the child had not chosen) across familiarization trials. A repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA, with looking time to chosen toy as the dependent variable, trial type
(similar or dissimilar puppet) as a within-subjects measure, and condition as a
between-subjects measure, revealed no main eﬀect of trial-type F(1,33) = 0.30, p = .58,
gp
2 = 0.009, condition F(1,33) = 1.30, p = .26, gp
2 = 0.04, or interaction between trial-
type and condition F(1,33) = 1.26, p = .27, gp
2 = 0.04. Thus, across conditions, tod-
dlers systematically attended to the toy chosen by the puppet, regardless of whether
the puppet chose the same toy as the child or not (see Figure 4), suggesting that sal-
iency of the similar puppet or inattention to the dissimilar puppet during familiariza-
tion trials did not drive subsequent toy choice or interaction preference behavior.
Although no diﬀerences in attention to the two puppets were evidenced during
familiarization, it was important to assess attention during toy choice test trials,
because this was the only portion of the session when both puppets were simultane-
ously visible. If, during these more complex scenes, toddlers looked more to the similar
puppet because he was more salient or the children liked him more, their subsequent
toy choices (during toy choice test trials) might solely be based on the fact that they
had not noticed the toy acted on by the dissimilar puppet. We therefore assessed
whether attention to the similar puppet and his chosen toy relative to attention to the
other puppet and toy diﬀered across conditions during toy choice test trials in a
repeated-measures ANOVA. There was no main eﬀect of puppet, F(1,33) = 0.008,
p = .93, gp
2 = <0.001 and no interaction between puppet and condition, F(1,33)
= 0.002, p = .97, gp
2 = <0.001. Thus, toddlers did not attend more to either puppet/toy
in either condition. A main eﬀect of condition, F(1,33) = 6.86, p = .013, gp
2 =0.17,
revealed that toddlers’ looking times to the puppets were longer across the Assign
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condition (estimated marginal mean = 11.83s, SEM = 0.34) than the Choose condition
(estimated marginal mean = 10.54s, SEM = 0.35). Because this was unexpected, we fol-
lowed up to see whether toddlers’ looking times to the experimenter diﬀered between
conditions. Although the trend was in the opposite direction (Choose: M = 2.62
(SEM = 0.53); Assign: M = 2.17 (SEM = 0.33)), this diﬀerence was nonsigniﬁcant, t
(33) = 0.73, p = .47. Therefore, we further explored whether the proportion of time
toddlers looked toward each puppet (e.g., (time looking toward similar puppet)/(time
looking toward either puppet + time looking toward experimenter)) diﬀered between
conditions. As before, this analysis revealed no main eﬀect of puppet or interaction
between puppet and condition (ps > 0.76) and the main eﬀect of condition washed
out, F(1,33) = 1.28, p = .27, gp
2 = 0.04. Further, duration of attention (i.e., amount of
time looking) to the similar puppet during test trials was unrelated to toddlers’ toy
choice with regard to the similar puppet (r = .16, p = .36).
DISCUSSION
Knowing when others are similar to oneself has profound eﬀects on infants’ and young
children’s future interactions with those individuals, inﬂuencing their future interactive
behaviors, imitation, and cultural learning (Meltzoﬀ, 2005). In this experiment, we
examined whether comparisons between matched or mismatched action choices (i.e.,
goal relations) between self and other inﬂuenced young toddlers’ identiﬁcation of and
responses to similar and dissimilar others. We found that 19-month-olds recognize
when others’ relational goals mirror their own based on matched action choices. They
act on this recognition by demonstrating a preference to interact with and match the
toy choices of an individual who acts similarly in her action choices. Previous research
on this topic largely focused on the identiﬁcation of similar others via perceptual
Figure 4 In familiarization trials, infants in both conditions attended more to the toy acted on by
the puppet than the toy not acted on and did so regardless of whether the puppet acted on the same
or diﬀerent toy than the one the child had chosen. *p < .05.
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features such as language and gender (e.g., Shutts et al., 2010). Identiﬁcation of these
kinds of similarities is important for shaping behavior in certain instances, but in other
instances, informative behavior crosses these borders and breaks down within these
larger categories. It is, therefore, important to identify when and how young children
begin to recognize similar others based on information that is not only perceptual or
featural but also based on the action choices (i.e., goal relations) of another individual.
Actions are particularly important because they are the means by which we can, at
some point, infer the mental states underlying behavior. We know that actions are
especially salient for infants and young children, who attend to actions and their out-
comes in their everyday environments (Amano, Kezuka, & Yamamoto, 2004). Hints of
the saliency of actions can be seen in our attentional data, in that toddlers always
attended more to the action occurring than to other features of the scenes presented to
them during both familiarization and test trials.
Identifying similar others is important not only for knowing with whom to interact,
but also because those who share common behaviors and preferences with us are
important sources of information concerning what we might want to do in the future
(Howard et al., 2014). The present ﬁndings provide novel evidence that 19-month-olds
recognize and act on similarities in action patterns between self and other. In acting
on this information, toddlers were able to generalize from prior behavior to inform
their own actions on novel objects. That is, not only toddlers recognized that the simi-
lar puppet chose the same toys as them during familiarization, but also they chose the
same toy as the similar puppet when viewing the puppet act on novel toys to which
they had no prior exposure in toy choice test trials. This ﬁnding is in accord with Faw-
cett and Markson’s (2010) ﬁnding that toddlers base their actions on universally com-
mon preferences of others within a domain. The current ﬁndings go further in that the
similar puppet’s actions were deﬁned by the speciﬁc choice of the child in that trial,
rather than consistently choosing an objectively more interesting toy across partici-
pants. Tracking the similarity of individual action choices requires more than a nearly
universal categorization of items as fun vs. not. Instead, toddlers had to identify their
own choices and how their actions related to those of each puppet. Thus, toddlers’
actions during test trials were not based on a general trait of the other individual. Tod-
dlers’ preference to aﬃliate with and copy the toy choice of a particular individual was
based on more than mere perceptual or featural information.
Critically, unlike prior research (e.g., Mahajan & Wynn, 2012), the current research
is controlled for the possibility of lower-level accounts based on association or saliency
by measuring toddlers’ attention to diﬀerent aspects of the familiarization and test tri-
als. Given evidence that infants prefer to look more toward individuals who are similar
to them (Kinzler et al., 2007; Meltzoﬀ, 2007), without controlling for attention, any
possible diﬀerences in preference for or imitation of one puppet could be based on
attending more (i.e., looking longer) to that puppet. Although this ﬁnding would be
interesting in that it would be consistent with the notion that toddlers viewed the simi-
lar puppet as like them in the Choose condition but not in the Assign condition, it
would make it diﬃcult to interpret toddlers’ action choices during test trials. Addition-
ally, an alternative explanation for this ﬁnding in the current study would be that tod-
dlers simply looked longer to the toy he or she had previously chosen and the similar
puppet simply happened to be in that vicinity. Although the Assign condition largely
controlled for this possibility, we further accounted for it by measuring looking times
during the familiarization trials. We found that toddlers attended similarly to both
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puppets during both familiarization and test trials and across both conditions. Thus,
toddlers’ propensity to interact with and match toy choices of the similar puppet in
the Choose condition was not a function of longer looking to that puppet or the pup-
pet’s toy choice. The fact that attention did not diﬀer between conditions speaks to the
underlying mechanism of toddlers’ behavior and negates the possibility that attentional
mechanisms drove toddlers’ actions in this research. Instead, we suggest that children
recognized that the puppets’ actions shared the same relational goal (i.e., relation
between agent and speciﬁc goal object) as their own actions during familiarization (see
Gerson, 2014) and that they acted on this relational comparison between their own
actions and those of the puppets.
The ﬁnding that children prefer to interact with others who previously made similar
action choices as themselves is consistent with a large literature suggesting that both
humans and nonhuman primates prefer others who act like themselves, whether when
producing instrumental actions or making intransitive movements. Mimicry, the auto-
matic mirroring of others’ movements, leads to increased preference for and trust of
the person doing the mimicking (in the person being mimicked; Lakin, Jeﬀeris, Cheng,
& Chartrand, 2003). Although these eﬀects have not been greatly studied in develop-
mental populations (but see Meltzoﬀ, 2007; van Schaik, van Baaren, Bekkering, &
Hunnius, 2013), similar eﬀects of preference for individuals who mimicked one’s
actions were found in rhesus macaques (Paukner, Suomi, Visalberghi, & Ferrari,
2009), suggesting that preference for similarly acting others is a widespread mechanism
in primates.
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY
The lack of signiﬁcant diﬀerence in toy choice between the two conditions indicates
that the diﬀerent outcomes of toy choice behavior in the two conditions should be
interpreted cautiously. One possible reason for this lack of interaction is that the sam-
ple sizes were appropriate for testing within condition eﬀects but were too small to
detect a diﬀerence between conditions in what may be a subtle eﬀect. Despite the small
sample sizes, signiﬁcant diﬀerences between conditions were still evident in toddlers’
preference to interact with a particular puppet.
One possibility for a lower-level alternative account that must be ruled out is the
simple diﬀerence in number of experimenters present between the two conditions. In
the Assign condition, a second experimenter sat silently throughout the experiment
except when asked a question. Perhaps toddlers’ attention to or interpretation of the
events diﬀered due to the presence of this second experimenter. The lack of diﬀerence
in attention to the ongoing events across conditions suggests that the second experi-
menter’s presence did not inﬂuence children’s attention to the events. Still, it is possible
that their actions diﬀered based on the presence of this experimenter, but there is no
strong theoretical or observable explanation for this possibility.
In the present study, there is no direct evidence that toddlers perceived the puppet’s
actions as reﬂective of their internal states. That is, the toddlers could have recognized
that the puppets were acting on their preferences or they could have simply recognized
the similarity between their own actions and those of the puppet without assigning
mentalistic labels to the actions. Whether or not their interpretation of the puppets’
behavior was mentalistic, the lack of eﬀect observed in the Assign condition and the
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similar attentional patterns across conditions indicates that toddlers’ actions (i.e., toy
choice and interaction preference) in the Choose condition were based on the identiﬁ-
cation of the similarity between goal relations (i.e., a behavioral analysis of the action
choices) rather than an association between the puppets and particular toys or the
saliency of the actions. Interestingly, toddlers’ actions in the toy choice test trials
occurred in the absence of the puppets, suggesting that children were not acting based
on aﬃliative motivations and instead were perhaps instead acting based on the knowl-
edge that they would be more likely to prefer a toy chosen by a similar puppet (i.e.,
motivation to play with what they might perceive as the “better” toy on an individual
level).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This research is the ﬁrst to directly show that young toddlers can use information
about another individual’s actions in relation to the self to recognize them as similar
to themselves and apply this knowledge in relevant novel contexts (i.e., to make future
action choices). The present data focused on toddlers’ identiﬁcation of individuals they
observed producing similar or dissimilar action tendencies as themselves. Whether
these ﬁndings relate to toddlers’ identiﬁcation of in-group vs. out-group members of
groups is currently unknown but could have implications for social development more
generally. The fact that toddlers preferred to interact with a puppet that chose the
same toys as them is consistent with research indicating preferences for in-group mem-
bers in infants and young children (Cvencek, Greenwald, & Meltzoﬀ, 2016; Dunham,
Baron, & Banaji, 2008), but whether identiﬁcation of a similar individual follows a
similar developmental trajectory as identiﬁcation of in-group membership is an impor-
tant question for future research. It is possible, for example, that the comparison pro-
cesses evidenced in the current research interact with or work in conjunction with, for
example, recognition of perceptual similarities and motivational or attentional factors
that inﬂuence group membership identiﬁcation throughout the development.
Future research is needed to identify the breadth and constraints associated with
this process. What role does the contrastive nature of the similar vs. dissimilar other
play? Do toddlers adaptively constrain the behavioral inﬂuence of the similar other to
relevant domains or does this extend to other domains, such as food (see Fawcett &
Markson, 2010 for discussion)? Would toddlers rely more so on the similar other to
teach them novel actions that might have cultural relevance, as would be expected if
the other were truly considered an in-group member (see Howard et al., 2014 for dis-
cussion)? Uncovering the answers to these important questions will allow us to better
understand the origins of children’s recognizing others as “like them” and delve deeper
into the question of how and when they learn from similar others.
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